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DISCUSSION RESPONSE
The Role of Human Rights 
in the Realm of Arms 
Transfers
The Example of Germany
Elif Askin picked a current, important, and yet rarely 
discussed issue for her insightful post and offered a 
compelling perspective on human rights law and arms 
transfers. By transferring arms to regions where the human 
rights situation is precarious, Germany risks to contribute to 
human rights violations, as Elif has highlighted. I will use this 
opportunity to take up the example of Germany and look at 
how the human rights situation in the receiving state in 
practice limits arms transfers and where the shortcomings 
lay. I will start with a brief overview of the laws on arms 

transfers within Germany and continue with the role the 
human rights situation in the receiving state plays within the 
laws and more specifically the process of authorisation. In 
conclusion I submit that while in the case of Germany human 
rights are part of the laws on arms transfers, without 
stronger mechanisms to enforce this commitment it is still 
prone to be marginalized. As long as the currently existing 
mechanisms operationalizing the due diligence obligation to 
prevent (as pointed to by Elif in her last paragraph) are not 
accompanied by the possibility for judicial review the impact 
of human rights in practice is at risk of coming to nothing.
The general legal framework regarding arms transfers in 
Germany
The German law on arms transfers is difficult to grasp as it 
involves many actors, differs depending on the transferred 
goods, and is in big parts shaped by practice.
According to Art. 26 para. 2 of the Basic Law the power to 
authorize fabrication, licensing, or transportation of war 
weapons, is vested in the Federal Government. The 
Government factually delegated this power to the ‘Federal 
Security Council’, a cabinet committee that is not comprised 
of all Members of Government – which is why doubts have 
been raised as to the constitutionality of this procedure.
This provision of the Basic Law is also the legal basis for the 
War Weapons Control Act, which together with the Foreign 
Trade and Payments Act – applicable not only to war 
weapons but also dual use items and all other armaments – 
forms the core of the German legislation on arms transfers. 
Decisions ought to be made with the ‘Political Principles 
adopted by the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Germany for the Export of War Weapons and Other Military 
Equipment’ in mind, which will be discussed below.
The special case of arms transfers as military aid or gifts
Transfers like in the case of the Peschmerga are to be 
subsumed under ‘Länderabgabe’, which means that they are 
stemming from the stock of the armed forces and are 
provided mostly free of charge to other Governments. There 
are no specific laws guiding this procedure. It was developed 
over time in practice. Details are vague and information is 
scarce. Deeper insight is further obscured by the fact that 
transfers of this nature are often classified due to their 
foreign policy and security dimension and are therefore only 
mentioned by way of example in the yearly arms exports 
report.
If the transport is conducted by the armed forces there is no 
need for a licence under the War Weapons Control Act but 
there is still the need for an export licence under the Foreign 
Trade Act. This is why the ‘Political Principles’ that will be 
further discussed hereinafter still apply to such decisions no 
matter the specific process.
The role of human rights in the decision making process
Germany aims at discharging its human rights obligations by 
taking into account the human rights practice of the 
receiving state when deciding over and executing arms 
transfers of any kind. There are two ways to do this: Through 
the ‘Political Principles Adopted by the Government of the 
Federal Republic of Germany for the Export of War Weapons 
and Other Military Equipment’ on one hand and the ‘end-use 
certificate’ on the other hand.
According to the ‘Political Principles’ the human rights 
practices of the recipient country play an essential role when 
deciding over the issuance of a export licence, especially 
when transferring them to a country that is not EU, NATO, or 
NATO-equivalent (the latter currently concerns Australia, 
New Zealand, Switzerland and Japan). But the vague wording 
leaves much room for interpretation. For example it is to be 
defined on a case by case basis what reasonable grounds to 
suspect that the arms are used in the sustained and 
systematic abuse of human rights that leads to a denial of a 
licence by principle means.
Furthermore the ‘Political Principles’ are non-binding, and 
thus no legal action whatsoever can be brought based on 
them. A recent motion of the Green Party to include the 
‘Political Principles’ in the War Weapons Control Act and the 
Foreign Trade Act – which would make them justiciable – did 
not find a majority in the Bundestag, the German Parliament.
The fact that decisions are not subject to judicial scrutiny is 
crucial for understanding the divergence of the commitment 
to human rights in the ‘Political Principles’ as opposed to the 
facts: According to a non-official 2014 report , in 62 countries 
to which Germany exported weapons, the human rights 
situation is “highly questionable” (p. 56).
This is but one indication that the human rights situation 
plays a role in the process of weighing the competing 
interests when deliberating arms transfers – yet it will hardly 
succeed in outweighing the other interests if the decision 
cannot at all be called into question and needs not to be 
explained but only reported on by the Government.
The second possibility in Germany to take the human rights 
situation in the receiving state into account is via so called 
‘end-use certificates’. The control of the whereabouts of the 
weapons once they are delivered and the purposes they will 
be used for is governed by the end-use certificate, requiring 
the receiver of an arms transfer to sign a statement in which 
it is laid out how and where the arms will be used. While this 
practice acknowledges that the responsibility of a state does 
not end after the transfer itself the effectiveness of these 
statements is disbelieved. Even more so as cases in which 
German weapons resurfaced in areas of conflict despite end-
use certificates were brought to attention. This doubt led to 
discussions within the Government of reforming the end-use 
controls and in 2016 this resulted in the introduction of ‘post 
shipment controls’. These controls allow for on-site controls 
in the country of destination for all armament. A major 
problem that might arise is that big parts of the armaments 
are used by the armed forces or law enforcement of the 
receiving state and are thus related to national security. 
Controls that touch upon such matters seem highly unlikely 
so the feasibility and execution of ‘post shipment controls’ in 
practice needs to be seen.
No right without a remedy
What can be deduced from the above is that the role of 
human rights in the process of deciding over arms transfers 
in Germany is clear – in theory. However I submit that an 
obligation to take possible human rights violations under 
advisement that is not accompanied by a remedy puts them 
at risk of being pushed aside eventually. This goes especially 
for areas like arms transfers where human rights are 
competing with security interests and policy considerations. 
Here in particular does the lack of possibilities to challenge 
transfer decisions with more than political debate bear the 
risk that human rights are trivialized.
I concur with Elif that a due diligence obligation to prevent 
will help to “internalize international human rights norms 
into the national decision-making process“ and therefore 
further the application of human rights to arms transfer 
decisions. Nevertheless, as illustrated by the case of 
Germany, true respect for human rights can only be 
guaranteed when the modes of operationalization of the due 
diligence obligation are enforceable by judicial review and 
the Government can be tied to its commitments.
Whether or not the possibility of judicial review can further 
the impact of human rights might be observed in a current 
case in the UK: On June 30  a High Court granted permission 
to the NGO Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) to take the 
decision of the Government to supply arms to Saudi-Arabia 
to judicial review in light of IHRL and IHL violations of Saudi-
Arabia and the Saudi led coalition in Yemen.
Larissa Furtwengler is a PhD candidate at Heidelberg 
University and researcher at MJC Rechtsanwälte
ISSN 2510-2567
Tags: Armed Conflict , Extraterritoriality , Human Rights
Print Facebook Twitter Email
th
   
Related
Blackmarketing 
“Bundeswehr” 
Weapons in Northern 
Iraq
Insights from the 
Practitioner of 
International Law
Respect and Protection 
of International Law 
Beyond the Borders (of 
Human Rights)
25 July, 2016
In "Discussion"
8 October, 2014
In "Interview" 24 June, 2015
In "Discussion"
No Comment
Leave a reply 
Logged in as ajv2016. Log out?
SUBMIT COMMENT
 Notify me of follow-up comments by email.
 Notify me of new posts by email.
PREVIOUS POST
Blackmarketing “Bundeswehr” Weapons in Northern 
Iraq 

NEXT POST
Between Aspirations and Realities 
Copyright © 2016 · | ISSN 2510-2567 | Impressum & Legal    
